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Abstract What kind of equality should we value and why? Current debate centres
around whether distributive equality is valuable. However, it is not the only
(potentially) morally significant form of equality. David Miller and T. M. Scanlon
have emphasised the importance of social equality—a strongly egalitarian notion
distinct from distributive equality, and which cannot be reduced to a concern for
overall welfare or the welfare of the worst-off. However, as debate tends to focus on
distribution, social equality has been neglected and we do not have a clear under-
standing of what it is and why it might be valuable. This paper aims to address this
gap.
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Introduction
In the US, black people were often expected to step off the pavement to get out of
the way of approaching whites.1 In apartheid South Africa, black people were
expected to call white men ‘Baas’, which means ‘Boss’ in Afrikaans, and white
women, ‘Madam’.2 Although typically this is what black people would call their
white employers, they were often expected to call any white people, including
strangers, ‘Baas’ or ‘Madam’. White people, on the other hand, would often refer to
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1 See, for example, Jennie Brown’s (1994, p. 26) biography of the civil rights activist, Medgar Evers.
2 For examples, see Nelson Mandela’s (1995, pp. 145, 413) autobiography.
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adult blacks as ‘boy’ or ‘girl’. These are examples of what can be called social
inequality.
Now, it is obvious that inequalities between races, and particularly those of
apartheid, whether inequalities in income distribution, power or political partici-
pation, for example, are gross violations of justice. The point of identifying social
equality, however, is to say that the inequalities associated with having to get out of
someone else’s way merely because you belong to one group and they to another are
wrong even if there are no (other) violations of justice3 associated with these
inequalities.4 In this paper, I argue that social equality is a significant and distinct,
yet neglected, component of what it means to treat people as equals.5
Discussions of equality in contemporary philosophy tend to be dominated by
questions about the role of equality in distributive justice, in other words, by what
can be called ‘distributive equality’. Debate tends to centre around two primary
topics: (1) the currency of justice, in other words, what kind of equality is important,
e.g. resources, welfare, or capabilities,6 and (2) the pattern of distribution, in other
words, whether equality per se is indeed significant, or whether justice will be better
served through sufficiency (providing ‘enough’) or prioritising resources for the
worst off.7
While debate centres on these two topics, social equality is mainly neglected.
This neglect is regrettable, however. As Scanlon (2000) has highlighted, this form of
equality is one of the few genuinely egalitarian notions of equality. In contrast,
many theorists are beginning to doubt that what tends to be referred to as
distributive equality has much to do with equality per se, and is, arguably, more to
3 I discuss social inequalities as separable from violations of justice such as violations in the distributions
of material goods and in power and political participation, for example, even though they often occur in
conjunction with violations of justice or can lead to these violations of justice. However it is possible to
see violations of social inequality as injustices in of themselves, beyond merely being morally
objectionable. I take no particular stance on whether, as morally objectionable inequalities, social
inequalities are also indeed injustices. I thus say (other) violations of justice to take account of the view
that social inequalities could indeed, but need not be, violations of justice.
4 There could be practical reasons why some people (one group) should get out of other people’s way
(another group)—for example, it might be expected that if you are able-bodied or unencumbered, you
should be expected to get out of the way of someone who has difficulty walking or is carrying heavy
burdens. These would not be examples of social inequality—if anything they could be seen as means for
trying to achieve equality through compensation.
5 As social inequalities tend to occur along with other kinds of injustices, the distinction I draw between
social equality and overlapping but distinct notions such as distributive equality is primarily analytical.
6 See, for example, Rawls on primary goods as an example of the resourcist approach (1999, Sect. 11,
pp. 54–55; Sect. 15, pp. 78–81. I will refer throughout this paper to this edition of A Theory of Justice,
revised from the original of 1971) and Dworkin (1981a, b) for a defence of resourcism and criticism of
welfarism. See also Sen (1982), Nussbaum (2000) and Anderson (2010) on capabilities, and Arneson
(1989, 2006) for his defence of equal opportunity for welfare as the currency of justice, and criticism of
the capabilities approach.
7 See, for example, Lucas (1965), Frankfurt (1987) and Crisp (2003) on sufficiency, and Parfit (1997) on
the priority view as an alternative to valuing equality of welfare per se. For a defence of equality as
valuable per se, see Temkin (1993, 2003). For a recent clarification and criticism of sufficiency, and
its relationship to equality and priority, see Casal (2007), and for a clarification and defence of
egalitariainism, see O’Neill (2008).
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do with alleviating the deprivation suffered by those who are worst off in society. If
we want to identify when inequalities are wrong, we need to move beyond merely
focusing on distributive equality. Although some theorists such as Miller (1998) and
Scanlon (2000, n.d.) have provided nascent descriptions of social equality and its
import, there is a lack of clarity about this notion of equality and, subsequently, we
require much greater analysis. This paper aims to address this gap.
As the notion of social equality is neglected, and thus we need to start analysing
social equality from the ground up, this paper will focus on asking and providing in-
depth answers to two rudimentary but essential questions: (1) What is social
equality? and (2) Why is it valuable? Answering these questions can help to lay the
groundwork for developing an extensive theory of social equality.
There are three sections to this paper. In the next section, I briefly highlight
recent discussions about social equality to provide a context for the more in-depth
analysis in the following sections, which aim, respectively, to answer the two
primary research questions identified above. In the section after that, I describe
social equality as consisting of, at least, one necessary condition—an opposition to
hierarchies of social status—and identify a distinction between what I refer to as
direct and indirect social inequalities. In the last section I consider the value of
social equality, focusing particularly on the harms of inequality to those of higher
status, mainly as this has been neglected.
Intimations of Social Equality
Miller (1998) has distinguished two types of equality: (1) distributive equality,
which requires that certain social goods are distributed equally as a requirement of
justice and (2) social equality, which identifies a social ideal—‘the ideal of a society
that is not marked by status divisions such that one can place different people in
hierarchically ranked categories’ (Miller 1998, p. 23). Most discussions of equality
seem to be about the former kind, and yet Miller believes that it is important not
to neglect social equality as it identifies ‘a form of life in which people in a very
important sense treat one another as equals’ (Miller 1998, p. 32).
Scanlon (2000) considers a similar notion of equality, claiming it constitutes one
of the few genuinely egalitarian reasons why we object to inequality. He identifies
five primary reasons why it could be said to be important to eliminate inequalities,
not all of which are actually egalitarian. Of these, however, he identifies
‘stigmatizing differences in status’ as one of the few reasons we have to reduce
inequalities which is actually concerned with achieving equality per se. He claims
that eliminating these differences in status is part of the ideal of a society in which
people all regard one another as equals and that this ideal ‘has played a more
important role in radical egalitarian thinking than the idea of distributive justice
which dominates much discussion of equality in our time’ (Scanlon 2000, p. 43).
Raising an overlapping notion of equality, Anderson (1999) and Scheffler (2003)
have voiced concerns about how a prominent contemporary theory of social justice,
what Anderson has dubbed luck-egalitarianism, fails to be genuinely egalitarian
because it does not show equal respect and concern for all citizens, in part because it
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creates stigmatizing or marginalising hierarchies of worth. Equality is not, Anderson
and Scheffler argue, primarily to do with luck, or even with the distribution of social
goods, but rather to do with relationships between people—an equal society will
aim to abolish hierarchies of worth so that people are genuinely treated as equals.
Social equality, as highlighted by these theorists, seems to bear a greater
resemblance to the foundational notions of equality often underlying real-life
egalitarian movements than distributive equality does.8 As Anderson highlights, it
seems to capture the type of equality and the emphasis on a common humanity at
the heart of actual political movements better than a notion of equality of welfare or
of resources (Anderson 1999, p. 288). Think, for example, of many civil rights
movements, which are often fundamentally committed to a society in which people
stand in equal relations to each other, meaning one race, for example, is not deemed
better or worse than another. Social equality is also significant in the history of the
theoretical debate about equality with philosophers such as Rousseau (1984)
disparaging what can be called ‘the Aristotelian argument’, which presented
inequalities in social rank as justified on the basis of natural inequalities
(Dahrendorf 1972). Rousseau, on the other hand, considered hierarchies of status
to be primarily socially derived—natural inequalities may compound social
inequalities but they are neither the ultimate cause nor a justification for these
inequalities (see, Rousseau 1984 Pt. 2, esp. pp. 114,118).
Despite the clear significance of the notion of social equality, it requires much
closer analysis. An explicit, detailed model of social equality, distinguished
analytically from (other) injustices has not yet been provided: Miller and Scanlon,
for example, only provide us with clues as to what a society characterised by social
equality would look like. If social equality is to form a meaningful answer to the
question of which forms of equality are desirable, we need to know what it is.
Although Miller may be right that ‘[i]t is possible to elucidate the ideal of social
equality in various ways, but difficult to give it a sharp definition’, we should not let
this difficulty stop us from clarifying the notion (Miller 1998, p. 31).
What is Social Equality? An Opposition to Status Hierarchies
A common thread among discussions of social equality (and related notions) is that
it is fundamentally opposed to what Scheffler refers to as ‘hierarchies of social
status’ (Scheffler 2003, p. 22). Miller describes a society of equals as one ‘that is not
marked by status divisions such that one can place different people in hierarchically
ranked categories, in different classes for instance’ (Miller 1998, p. 23). Anderson
describes inegalitarianism as a commitment to ‘basing a social order on a hierarchy
8 This is not to say that distributive equality might not also be a significant notion. What I question is that
it should be the only significant notion of equality. Often descriptions of a particular type of equality are
associated with the claim that it is the only type of morally significant equality. This is not my claim about
social equality. Furthermore, although it is possible to see social equality as a foundational notion and to
use it as a basis to defend other forms of equality, I do not believe that social equality needs to be seen in
this way. One could feasibly claim that it is simply one of a number of significant aspects of what we
mean when we describe a society of equals.
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of human beings ranked according to intrinsic worth’ (Anderson 1999, p. 312). An
opposition to ranking people according to hierarchies of social status appears to be
the central tenet of social equality.9 But what exactly does it mean to be opposed
to hierarchies of social status? What are status hierarchies? We need to flesh out
these ideas. In this section, I will (1) describe status hierarchies as expressions of
inferiority and superiority, indicated by both an evaluation and an expression of
that evaluation, and (2) distinguish between (a) direct social inequalities which
unambiguously indicate inferior/superior treatment and (b) indirect inequalities
which create status inequalities through, for example, particular distributions of
social goods.
A status hierarchy occurs when a behaviour, social practice or policy expresses a
particular kind of unequal relationship between a person or group of people, and
others. More specifically, it is a relationship between inferiors and superiors. In this
relationship, one person10 is deemed to be an inferior in relation to another person,
who is either directly deemed to be a superior or who, by virtue of their relationship
to an inferior person, automatically becomes the superior.11 Returning to the
example of social inequality I used at the beginning of the paper, the act of stepping
off the pavement at the approach of a white person reflects and reinforces the
superiority of the white person over the inferior black person.
When one person is treated as a superior and another as an inferior this does not
necessarily imply that the superior person is treated very well or that the inferior
person is necessarily severely disadvantaged, or devalued. The point, when we refer
to hierarchies of social status, is the nature of the relationship between social
positions, not the absolute level of treatment. Subsequently, it is not that those
9 The term ‘social’ equality is ambiguous. For example, it could be used as a much broader term to
indicate any socially-caused inequality. However, my use of the term, following on from Runciman
(1967) and Miller (1998), separates social equality (or what can also be called status equality) from
related, overlapping notions such as equality of power. It is for this reason, for example, that I do not
discuss exploitation or domination, which are usually linked to economic and political power. As
emphasised in the introduction, this is primarily an analytical distinction, and thus social inequalities are
seldom found to be separate from other forms of inequalities in practice. It is necessary to draw such a
distinction, however, precisely for the purposes of this paper, which is to determine what social equality is
as a distinct, genuinely egalitarian ideal which cannot be reduced to other concerns, for example, about
power and wealth. However, although I claim social inequalities cannot be reduced to other forms
of inequality, power hierarchies will, of course, often also imply status inequality. What kind of a
relationship there is between inequality of power and inequality of status requires greater exploration as a
topic on its own.
10 For ease of description, I will refer here to a person in comparison to another person. Mainly, however,
social inequalities occur between groups of people. Although it is possible to have (somewhat) personal
status hierarchies, the hierarchies to which I am referring are those usually constructed by a social group
or community or society, rather than an individual or isolated groups of individuals. Something similar
can be said about those who are on the lower rungs of the hierarchy: although in practice it may be only
one particular individual who is marginalised, perhaps they are the only black person in a small
community, they are often marginalised because they belong to a particular social group or because they
do not belong to a particular social group, or, most likely, a combination of both. However, I do not think
that social equality is intrinsically group-related. An individual can still be treated as inferior even if this
is not associated with any particular group membership.
11 Or vice versa—one person could be deemed superior in relation to another person, who is either
directly deemed to be an inferior or who, by virtue of their relationship to a superior person, automatically
becomes the inferior.
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devalued are necessarily treated badly or that those treated as superiors are
privileged that is foremost the problem (although this is usually indeed what occurs
in practice): it is that they are not treated as equals. This is what makes social
equality strongly egalitarian.
Precisely what makes a notion of equality ‘strongly’ egalitarian is, of course, part
of the debate surrounding the value of equality. However, in describing social
equality as strongly egalitarian, I adopt Scanlon’s description of what it means to
be ‘genuinely’ egalitarian (Scanlon n.d., p. 6). Strongly egalitarian objections to
inequality, Scanlon claims, are (1) comparative, meaning they are concerned with
the relation between individual’s positions or level of benefits, and (2) unspecific,
meaning they are not ‘concerned with the absolute levels of these benefits: it is the
difference between the benefits enjoyed by the two groups that matters, not the
failure of either of these to meet some specified minimum’ (Scanlon n.d., p. 6).
A theory of social equality is comparative, being concerned with the relationship
between individuals and their relative positions in a status hierarchy, and it is
unspecific, in other words it is not concerned with the actual level of benefits or
welfare of those on the hierarchy. This could be contrasted to a notion of distributive
equality. As discussed in the introduction to this paper, many critics claim that
distributive equality is not valuable per se and that what seems to be a concern for
equality is actually a concern for something else, e.g. the deprivation of those who
are worst off in society (see particularly, Parfit (1997) as example). In the last
section of this paper, I will return to the discussion of how social equality seems to
be a strongly egalitarian ideal by emphasising that it cannot be reduced to a concern
for the welfare of the worst off.
Social equality, then, expresses an ideal where people stand in equal relation to
each other rather than being treated as better or worse, inferior or superior. When
someone is considered to be an inferior, this consists of both (1) an evaluation and
(2) an expression of that evaluation. Consider the relationship between an individual
bearing the title Doctor (Dr) and another with the title Mister (Mr) in a society in
which great prestige and honour is associated with titles and those with lesser titles
are treated as inferiors. We could say that the Mr (1) is valued less than the Dr,
meaning he is considered to be, at least in certain ways, a lesser person, and (2) this
evaluation finds some form of expression, such as in expectations, behaviour, and
even policy. For example, the Mr is expected to act obsequiously, ‘bowing’,
‘scraping’ and ‘fawning’ in the presence of the Dr to indicate his inferior status.12
Being treated as superior also breaks down into (1) an evaluation and (2) an
expression of that evaluation, but in this case it is a mode of expression that esteems
or reveres, or, at least, treats the person deemed as superior to be of higher value
than those who are inferior. Additionally, although status hierarchies have at least
two levels by necessity, those treated as superior and those as inferior, it is also
12 I refer to Walzer (1983, p. xiii): ‘This is the lively hope named by the word equality: no more bowing
and scraping, fawning and toadying; no more fearful trembling; no more high-and-mightiness.’ The
overall example owes a debt to Walzer as well—he refers to a society of equals as a ‘society of misters’
(p. 256)—although note that in contrast, I will claim that we need to distinguish between titles, per se, and
unequal relationships, which holds out the possibility that titles with a functional purpose are compatible
with an equal society.
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possible for a hierarchy to be more complex and consist of layers of social
stratification, each with implications for evaluation and the expression of
evaluation—think of caste in India, for example.
The evaluation and its expression are both necessary in terms of describing how
social positions on a status hierarchy are indicated. Evaluation provides a necessary
condition for distinguishing between mere differences, on the one hand, and social
inequalities, on the other. Consider our example of the titles ‘Dr’ and ‘Mr’. In of
themselves, these titles do not necessarily indicate social inequalities: we could
imagine a society which conferred titles, but where no particular value was
associated with any of the titles. Consider, for example, a society which conferred
the title Doctor to medical doctors only to make them more easy to identify in a
medical emergency (with the further proviso that in this society being a medical
doctor is not necessarily considered to be more prestigious than other jobs).
Subsequently, being a Dr does not make you any better than being a Mr, even
though it signifies a difference. It is only once these differences have been
associated with a particular evaluation, which leads to a ranking of the worth of the
bearers of these titles, that social inequality would ensue. Even conferring the title
Dr to someone with a PhD, would not in of itself imply a hierarchy of worth—it
only implies this if we associate some sort of value to having a higher education or a
PhD in particular. We could imagine a society in which having a higher education
was simply one of many options, none of which necessarily implied greater prestige
than another.13
The ranking of social positions, Ralf Dahrendorf has emphasised, is central to the
distinction between social differentiation, where different but essentially equal
positions can be distinguished, and social stratification, where positions are ranked
differently in terms of status (Dahrendorf 1972, pp. 90–91). Dahrendorf points out,
for example, that a tendency to reduce status inequalities to a division of labour fails
to make this important distinction—a division of labour per se implies differen-
tiation rather than stratification:
From the point of view of the division of labour… there is no difference in
rank between the director-general, the typist, the foreman, the fitter and the
unskilled labourer… If in fact we do associate a rank order… with these …
activities, this is due to an additional act of evaluation which is neither caused
nor explained by the division of labour (Dahrendorf 1972, p. 97).
While the aspect of evaluation, and not differentiation per se, is a necessary
component, on its own it is insufficient to delineate social inequality—if I evaluated
someone as inferior or superior but this never found any sort of expression, it is
difficult to see how it could result in an unequal relationship between people. The
actual expression of the evaluation, through individual behaviour or through policy,
for example, is thus an essential part of what makes the relationship one of
inferiority and superiority.
13 Although, of course, this might raise the question of why a differentiating title would be necessary if it
did not indicate esteem, but this is different from the claim that giving someone a title is necessarily
indicative of a particular status.
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Emphasising both the evaluative and the expressive components of social
inequality are important analytically—they are not intended as a description of
chronology or causation. I am not claiming that status hierarchies are formed in a
particular chronological order, where people are first evaluated and ranked, and
subsequently this evaluation finds form in some sort of expression. It may be
tempting to explain injustices as caused by social inequality—in other words, it is
because of the oppressors’ belief in a particular group’s inferiority that they are
oppressed. Although this is possible, it is not necessary—one could treat someone as
inferior without actually believing they are inferior. I am also not claiming that the
evaluation made is necessarily conscious or intended, although in certain cases, such
as that of the white supremacist, the evaluation and expression are clearly intended.
However, even in the case of white supremacy, where there is an intentional claim
of inferiority, causation is unlikely to be simplistic, and claims that other races are
inferior could be rationalisation for economic exploitation, for example, rather than
being, or rather than merely being, the cause of oppression or discrimination.
The idea that evaluations need not be made intentionally leads us to a distinction
between two different kinds of social inequalities. We can call them (1) direct or (2)
indirect. The former is an inequality of status which directly and unambiguously
confers better status to some in comparison to others. Examples of these would be
expecting certain individuals to look down when they are spoken to, or to speak
only when spoken to (where these are indeed indicators of lower status in a specific
society).14 On the other hand an indirect social inequality is foremost a difference or
inequality of another kind (in other words, not a status inequality) but which
indicates or leads to a social inequality. For example, it could be a social policy that
seems to humiliate or marginalise a particular group of people, and thus by
implication to treat them as inferiors, without any necessarily conscious intention on
the part of those who developed and implemented the policy to confer inferior status
on this group. Scanlon points to this distinction by referring to two major sources
of stigmatizing differences of status. The first, corresponding to direct social
inequalities, occur when ‘institutions… treat some people in ways that could only be
understood as intended to express the view that they were inferior’ while the second,
corresponding to indirect social inequalities, occur when ‘institutional arrangements
that, while they did not have the aim of expressing inferiority, nonetheless had the
14 Runciman (1967) highlights that social inequality can be identified by looking for culturally specific
behaviours which treat individuals differently in terms of how much respect they are afforded, in contrast
to behaviours which treat them differently in terms of praise. For example, respect might be indicated by
bowing, while praise may be indicated by clapping, although these indicators will differ from society
to society. Social inequality ensues then when we demand that some individuals bow in the presence
of others, but it does not ensue when some individuals clap in the presence of others. I do not think,
however, that Runciman’s description is sufficient for distinguishing between behaviour that violates
social equality and that which is consistent with it. Runciman’s distinction would allow too much
questionable behaviour. For example, he implies that a ‘white skin appreciation’ society, which purports
to admire white skin in the same way as athletic ability is often admired, could be understood simply as a
form of praise (Runciman 1967, p. 222). However, in a non-ideal world marked by a history of the
oppression of, and continued discrimination against, non-white races, this, even if it is only a form of
praise when considering the type of behaviour alone, seems far too close to an understanding of white
superiority that it does not seem consistent with social equality.
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effect of giving rise to feelings of inferiority on the part of most reasonable citizens’
(Scanlon 2000, p. 52).
Indirect social inequalities demonstrate a significant relationship between social
inequality and other forms of inequalities, such as for example, those of wealth and
power. Other inequalities can create or reinforce social inequality, and thus a notion
of social equality could provide a foundation for evaluating other inequalities and,
more specifically, for example, for evaluating principles for the distribution of social
goods. Unequal distributions of certain social goods could create hierarchies of
social status. In order to achieve a society of equals, goods would need to be
distributed in ways which did not either create or reinforce unequal social status. As
Miller puts it: ‘If we want our society to be egalitarian, then we will try to shape our
distributive practices so that the emergence of hierarchy is discouraged’ (Miller
1998, p. 34).
It is within this context that we can understand part of Anderson’s (1999)
criticism of luck-egalitarianism—she claims, for example, that luck-egalitarian
policies will (a) allow individuals who make reasonable but ultimately unlucky
choices to become destitute and (b) humiliate the disadvantaged by branding them
as stupid, ugly or talentless. Although there may be no genuine belief that these
individuals are inferior, or there may be no intention to treat them as second-class
citizens, one could argue that these policies do indeed treat these individuals as
inferior.15
Large income gaps may also provide an example of a distributive inequality
which leads to social inequality. Scanlon claims that these gaps provide the most
obvious example of how status inequalities are created by certain kinds of
distributions—those who live at the bottom end of large wealth and income
inequalities, he claims, are shamed and humiliated by them (Scanlon 2000, p. 52).
Other examples could be policies which marginalise or exclude certain groups by
denying them social goods such as health care.
While one of the negative aims of a society of equals would be to reduce or
eliminate policies and activities which created or reinforced social inequalities, we
could look to the positive side of the question and consider, what a society of equals
would indeed look like. In other words, and for example, how would the basic
institutions of society have to be designed and which distributive policies would
need to be put in place to uphold socially equal relationships between individuals?
Miller claims that social equality requires a complex equality across separate
spheres of distribution, where social equality will be achieved by having many
autonomous distributive spheres, rather than ‘an across-the-board simple distribu-
tive equality’ (Miller 1998, p. 35).16 An alternative is Anderson’s claim that a
capabilities approach to distributive justice follows from the claim that citizens
15 Consider, as a similar example, Jonathan Wolff’s discussion of how opportunity conceptions of justice
humiliate welfare claimants by requiring ‘shameful revelation’ (Wolff 1998, p. 114).
16 For more on separate spheres, see Walzer (1983) and Miller (1995). Scanlon claims that although
Walzer’s notion of complex equality is open to much criticism as a theory of distributive justice, it could
be seen as feasible if limited merely to an approach for reducing the conflict between feelings of
inferiority and inevitable inequalities which arise from the values associated with skills and
accomplishment. See Scanlon (2000, p. 56).
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should stand in relations of equality to one another, as ‘[c]itizens [thus] have a claim
to a capability set sufficient to enable them to function as equals in society’
(Anderson 2010, p. 83).
As my purpose in this paper is only to focus on what social equality is and why it
is valuable, I will not take a stance on which principles or patterns of distributive
justice are likely to violate social equality and which are most compatible with
social equality. This is beyond the scope of a paper which primarily aims to lay the
groundwork for a theory of social equality. What should seem clear from the
discussion, however, is that it is not self-evident what influence different forms of
distributive justice would necessarily have on hierarchical relationships, and that,
indeed, there may be many different social arrangements that could either lead to or
lead away from social equality. Which will indeed be compatible with social
equality is, partially, an empirical issue—whether particular policies lead to status
hierarchies is something to be seen and tested. However, it is also open to
interpretation—for example, whether luck-egalitarian policies are indeed violations
of social equality needs to be explained and defended according to a robust theory
of social equality. Subsequently, we first need to know precisely what social
equality is and why it is important.
A theory of social equality could, therefore, be useful for evaluating principles of
distributive justice, although it will seldom be self-evidently clear which distribu-
tions social equality demands. Such a theory could also help to complete the picture
of what a society of equals would look like—something many theories of
distributive justice seem unable to provide in isolation, at least partially because
they tend to ignore ‘informal’ inequalities.
Social inequalities can be built into the formal legal and political framework of a
society. Extreme examples would be the caste system in India, the system of racial
classification in apartheid South Africa and the hierarchy of slaves, metics (resident
aliens) and citizens in Ancient Greece.17 Status hierarchies need not, however, be
legally coded and coercively enforced; they are often part of social structure without
necessarily being part of a society’s legal structure. Consider, for example, a social
norm which directs those of lower status to stand when someone of higher status
enters a room. Relationships of social inequality could thus be formal, codified and
institutionalised, or they can be informal and can characterise how people interact
on an everyday level, in private and socially, although usually they are both. With
an emphasis on the justice of institutions, distributive justice is often silent about
informal inequalities in civic life, the workplace, individual behaviour within the
family, associations and so on. A number of theorists have highlighted this gap and
argue that contemporary notions of distributive justice neglect what may be a
significant element of a society of equals—an egalitarian ethos (Wolff 1998; Mason
2000). Jonathan Wolff, for example, highlights that there may be ‘goods’ that
depend on the attitudes people have toward each other and thus there is more to a
society of equals than a fair scheme of the distribution of material goods. A notion
17 For an explanation and history of the caste system see Bayly (1999). For a history of apartheid, see
Louw (2004) and Terreblanche (2003). See Walzer (1983) on how the resident aliens of Ancient Athens,
the metics, were often treated with contempt and denied political and welfare rights.
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of social equality, because it is focused primarily on relationships, rather than
institutions, could be used to highlight the inequalities between individuals which
stem from their attitudes and everyday behaviour. Subsequently, a theory of social
equality may be a necessary part of developing a comprehensive description of a
society of equals, as theories of distributive justice seem unlikely to be able to
achieve this on their own.18
The Value of Social Equality and the Harms of Inequality
When we talk about what makes a society equal, besides other possible notions of
equality, a notion of status equality seems essential. When some people are
expected to act obsequiously towards others, even if there are no other associated
violations of justice, this is not equality. To say that this is not equality seems quite
clear. To claim, however, that violations of social equality are morally objectionable
(independently of violations of justice that may result from them or may cause
them) is quite another matter. Perhaps social inequality is distinct from (other)
violations of justice but what, if anything, makes it morally objectionable?
There are two primary kinds of claims that could be made about the value of
social equality. We could claim it has (1) intrinsic value or that it is constitutive of
something that is intrinsically valuable, or it has (2) instrumental value, or we could
refer to its negative effects. In this section I will (1) consider the intrinsic or
constitutive value of social equality, while conceding that this is challenging to
demonstrate, and (2) refer to the harms that result from social inequality, focusing
particularly on the harms of superior treatment. While focusing on the ill effects
of equality may seem unsatisfactory as this could indicate that equality is only
instrumentally valuable and thus that a concern for equality is only weakly
egalitarian, I will (3) highlight that this challenge does not apply to social equality
and that a concern with social equality cannot be reduced to a concern with overall
welfare or the level of welfare of the worst off.
The Intrinsic or Constitutive Value of Social Equality
For some it may be intuitively clear—treating an individual as inferior is inherently
wrong. If this is so, then social equality can be said to have intrinsic value. The
18 Fraser (1997) and Young (1990) have also criticised theories of distributive justice in ways that have
relevance for a notion of social equality. By focusing on cultural injustices and distinguishing these from
distributive justice, Fraser’s theory of recognition shares some important similarities with social equality.
There is also some overlap between a notion of social equality and Iris Marion Young’s politics
of difference. Young criticises justice defined in distributive terms claiming that injustice should rather
be understood in terms of domination and oppression, However, despite these overlaps, social equality
is distinct from Fraser and Young’s notions—social equality condemns a very specific type of the
relationship, that represented by status hierarchies, and centres itself explicitly as a form of
egalitarianism. It is both more specific and more strongly egalitarian than Fraser and Young’s theories.
Furthermore, unlike Young’s understanding of justice, a notion of social equality does not (necessarily)
imply that we should emphasise procedural justice and democratic decision-making over distributive
patterns.
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problem is that this seems to be a convincing claim only for those who share the
intuition—it is going to be difficult to convince those who do not share it that this
form of equality is indeed inherently wrong.19 One could also argue that social
equality has constitutive value by claiming that it is part of a wider ideal, which is in
of itself valuable. Social equality can be seen to be a necessary dimension of what it
means to treat people as if they have equal moral worth. Consider Scheffler, for
example, describing equality as an ideal which has social, political and moral
dimensions, where the moral dimension ‘asserts that all people are of equal worth
and that there are some claims that people are entitled to make on one another
simply by virtue of their status as persons’ (Scheffler 2003, p. 22). Notions of equal
moral worth (or what are commonly considered to be expressions of that worth,
equal respect and concern) are often accepted as foundational assumptions
underlying most contemporary theories of justice (Dworkin 1973, 2000; Kymlicka
2002; Christiano 2007. For a critique of the notion see Pojman 1997). As a basic
moral assumption, equal moral worth is seldom argued for, and indeed, it is
notoriously difficult to defend.20 These challenges have prompted Thomas
Christiano, despite being an adherent of the notion of equal worth, to refer to it
as ‘one of the most profound problems of moral philosophy’ (Christiano 2007,
p. 54).
With reference to social equality then, as long as one accepts the assumption of
equal moral worth, it seems fairly uncontroversial to claim that social equality is
indeed valuable. A rather straightforward interpretation of equal moral worth would
be likely to consider it incompatible with treating people as inferior or superior.
However, for those who do not share this assumption, the value of social equality
may remain obscure. As equal moral worth is such a challenging and entrenched
problem, I cannot hope to present a suitable defence here—this would be a topic of
its own. What we can emphasise, however, is that for some, treating individuals as
inferior is clearly wrong or clearly a violation of equal moral worth, and if this is
indeed so, then social equality is evidently valuable, however, these claims require
an extended justification.
The Harmful Effects of Social Inequality
It is easier to point to the harmful consequences of status inequality to demonstrate
that social equality is indeed valuable. The harmful effects that lead from inequality
can be classified as (1) individual or (2) social. Individuals can be harmed by being
treated as inferior, or as I will emphasise in some detail below, as superior. Someone
who is treated as inferior could suffer damage to her self-respect, or her ability to
19 This is primarily a problem for the notion of intrinsic value, rather than for social equality specifically.
However, there could be phenomena about which almost everyone shares the intuition that they are
valuable in of themselves (pleasure is probably an example here), and these kind of phenomena may (1)
indicate that the notion of intrinsic value is indeed meaningful and (2) call into question whether other
notions, about which this intuition is not so widely shared, are then valuable in of themselves.
20 However, Williams (1972) provides an excellent analysis of how common humanity and equal respect
as the foundations of a notion of equality, although admittedly ‘vague and inconclusive’ (p. 118), are not
at all as trivial or lacking in substance as inegalitarians often claim.
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form her conception of the good could be compromised.21 Social inequality can also
be said to cause harms to society—for example, more unequal societies seem to be
unhealthier (Wilkinson 1996; Marmot and Wilkinson 2006). Wilkinson and Pickett
(2009) have also claimed that a range of social harms, including obesity and crime,
are associated with inequality, and particularly with relative inequalities, not merely
absolute deprivation. Whether or not these individual or social harms do indeed
result from social inequality is often, at least partially, an empirical question, and
more empirical evidence may be needed to back-up some of the claims we could
make about the harmful consequences of social equality. There is however already
much empirical evidence to indicate that health is socially determined and that ill-
health is likely to be associated with relative positions in a status hierarchy (Marmot
2005; Marmot and Wilkinson 2006).22 Stretching his discussion across both
individual and social harms, Martin O’Neill emphasises that status inequalities can
create the full range of harmful conditions that motivate us to condemn distributive
inequalities, including objectionable inequalities in power and unhealthy fraternal
social relations (O’Neill 2008, pp. 121–123, 126–130).
The harms of inequalities are usually discussed either in terms of the harms to the
worst off or in terms of harms to society, or both. The potential harm associated
with being on the other side of the unequal relationship—of being treated as
superior—is neglected.23 This is regrettable—I think that hierarchies of status also
have harmful implications for those who are treated as superior, beyond merely the
effects they might feel in terms of harms to society. A morally distorted social
system which falsely deems some to have lesser worth and others greater, is likely
to harm not only those deemed inferior but also those considered superior.
As mentioned above in terms of the other harms associated with social inequality,
the harms of being treated as superior should, at least partially, be identified and
explicated by empirical research. However, drawing on interdisciplinary literature
on oppression, the following list indicates what could be considered some of the
primary ill effects of being treated as superior:
1. Impaired moral capacity: being treated as superior, particularly where this is
associated with extreme social stratification and with oppression, could foster
cruelty, a lack of empathy and inhumanity (see, for example, Freire 1996).24
21 See, for example, Rawls (1999: Sect. 67, pp. 386–391) and Honneth (1992) on the social basis of self-
esteem and self-respect. See Kernohan (1998) on how inegalitarian attitudes and beliefs in an
environment can distort conceptions of the good.
22 It is difficult to distinguish harms that could result from social inequality in isolation from overlapping
or resulting inequalities or violations of justice. One could argue that the harms that ensue are due to the
injustices rather than social inequalities per se, e.g. through overt discrimination or a lack of access to
primary social goods. What is particularly interesting about the research on the social determinants of
health, however, is that status in of itself seems to be linked to ill health, rather than (merely) material
well-being and access to health care.
23 Contemporary notions of equality seem to neglect this aspect of inequality but earlier understandings
at least tend to make reference to the harm of being treated as superior as well as that of being treated as
inferior. Consider for example, Matthew Arnold, quoted by Tawney (1938, p. 1), ‘On the one side…
inequality harms by pampering’.
24 Perhaps one might be tempted to claim that this sees causation the wrong way around—it is cruel and
inhumane people who develop these oppressive systems. Of course, it must be acknowledged that the
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Think of South Africa under apartheid. The harm that apartheid did to black and
coloured people, as well as people of other non-Caucasian races, is evident.
However, one could argue that whites were also harmed, albeit clearly not in
the same way or to even nearly the same extent as other races. The constant
tension or the threat of conflict between races, the demonization of blacks and
the tenuousness of apartheid’s purported justifications for a racial hierarchy,
could be seen to have fostered fear, suspicion, and cruelty in many whites,
which would influence not only their interactions with other races, but could
permeate any of their relationships. Consider, for example, Desmond Tutu’s
claims about the harms of apartheid, based on his experiences as chair of the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission:
This vicious system has had far more victims than anyone had ever thought
possible, because it is no exaggeration to say that we have all in different ways
been wounded by apartheid… In one way or another, as a supporter, a
perpetrator, a victim, or one who opposed the ghastly system, something
happened to our humanity… Those who were privileged lost as they became
more uncaring, less compassionate, less humane and therefore less human….
Those who opposed apartheid could also end up… becoming like what they
most abhorred (Tutu 1999, pp. 154–155).
2. Cognitive distortion: Being treated as superior could lead to self-deception as it
may be necessary to develop a false notion of reality and a distorted conception
of self and others in order to maintain belief in the ‘justice’ of the social system
and to help to maintain a good conscience in the face of the humiliation and
degradation of others (see, for example, Sue 2010, p. 128).
3. Emotional costs: whether as a result of the harms discussed above or for
additional reasons, it seems feasible that being treated as superior could have
severe emotional costs including heightened stress, anxiety and aggression. One
of the sources of these emotional costs could be the pressure to meet unrealistic
or elevated expectations and responsibilities—the pressure or the failure to
meet these expectations is likely to be harmful. Think of traditional norms of
masculinity which could demand of men that they remain strong and in control,
and provide for their families. The pressure men may feel to meet these
expectations or the failure they experience if they do not meet them could be
linked to emotional breakdowns, stress-related illnesses and even aggression
and violence (see, for example, Miles 1991).
Those treated as superior will also tend to be those who are better off in society
(measured both in terms of overall resources and welfare), while those who are
Footnote 24 continued
main architects of morally reprehensible social systems along with many of their supporters are indeed
cruel and inhumane, but it would be ridiculous to suggest that the social system itself did not have a
profound influence on the people who lived within it.
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treated as inferior are likely to be worse off. However, the harms associated with
higher status indicate that the ‘better off’ are not in an ideal position nor are they
necessarily even in a particularly positive position. Furthermore, one could say that
along certain dimensions of well-being they may be, at least, as badly off as those
who are worst off overall. Consider, for example, what Martha Nussbaum refers to
as ‘affiliation’:
‘[b]eing able to live with and towards others, to recognize and show concern
for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; to be
able to imagine the situation of another and to have compassion for that
situation; to have the capability for both justice and friendship (Nussbaum
2000, p. 79).
If we indeed recognise affiliation as an important dimension of well-being, it
seems likely that the harms associated with having higher status—a distorted moral
capacity, cognitive distortion and emotional costs—could severely diminish the
capability for affiliation. Although, practically, identifying the harms of superior
treatment may make no difference—after all this should not shift our concern from
the worst off to the better off—it does imply that a society of equals could hold
benefits for both the worst off and the better off, even if it demanded a decrease in
overall or material well-being for the better off (a possibility, at least in principle, as
I will explain in the next section).
In this section, I have focused a great deal on the implications of being treated as
superior. However, the proportion of the discussion devoted to superior treatment is
not intended as a reflection of the proportionality of harm and suffering associated
with hierarchies of status. In other words, I am not saying that the harm suffered by
those at the top is substantively or proportionally similar to those at the bottom, nor
that we should be as concerned about the implications of treating people as superior as
we should be with treating people as inferior. However, highlighting that being treated
as superior can also be harmful has important implications for discussions about
inequalities. Besides the fact that simply identifying and analysing these harms is
significant precisely because they have been neglected, a particularly important
implication is that the harms caused by superior treatment help to indicate that we
should not be concerned merely with the position of the worst off. Although it is
perfectly compatible to believe that both social equality and the level of welfare of the
worst off are morally significant, if we focused primarily or exclusively on the welfare
of the worst off we would not be able to recognise (and hence also, if necessary,
address) the harms associated with superior treatment. However, this description is
only a partial explanation for why a concern with social equality should not be reduced
to a concern with the worst off—in the next section I consider how social equality
avoids criticisms which claim that what seems to be a commitment to equality is often
actually only a concern for overall welfare or the welfare of the worst off.
Social Equality Versus Overall Welfare Or the Welfare of the Worst Off
Highlighting the value of social equality by referring to its harmful effects may raise
questions about whether social equality is indeed valuable. If we can only refer to
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the effects of a phenomenon to show its moral significance, then perhaps its effects
are actually morally significant rather than the phenomenon itself. This is often con-
sidered to be the case with equality, with the implication that genuine egalitarianism
stresses the intrinsic value of equality and not its effects, as inegalitarians such as
utilitarians (who believe that we should maximise total welfare) or prioritarians
(who believe that benefiting people matters more the worse off those people are)
could also value equality instrumentally.
This particular concern, however, seems to be primarily relevant to equality of
resources or welfare, and thus to distributive equality, rather than being applicable
to social equality. Those who claim to be egalitarians have been accused of not
actually valuing equality in of itself but rather valuing what an equal distribution (of
money, for example) is able to achieve such as a maximisation of welfare or the best
level of welfare for the worst off (Kagan 1998, pp. 48–54). Equality, here, is only
instrumentally valuable. Advocating this kind of equality (and none other) is
associated with what can be called ‘Weak egalitarianism’ (O’Neill 2008, p. 125).
Social equality, however, as I indicated in section ‘‘Intimations of Social
Equality’’ is strongly egalitarian as it is both comparative and unspecific (Scanlon,
n.d.). It appears to avoid the potential challenges associated with distributive
equality because its concern is with hierarchical relationships which are necessarily
comparative and which are foremost not related to specific levels of welfare. A
hierarchy is necessarily comparative as it requires at least two interdependent ranks.
Following on from Scanlon’s discussion of the reasons why we object to inequality,
Rawls puts it this way: ‘High status assumes other positions beneath it; so if we seek
a higher status for ourselves, we in effect support a scheme that entails others’
having lower status’ (Rawls 2001, p. 131). Rawls’s description emphasises that a
society of equals cannot mean that everyone has high status—this idea is incoherent
as by its very nature, high status must assume the existence of low status. If we aim
to remove the bottom layer of the hierarchy—those treated as inferior—we need to
break the hierarchical relationship itself. Taking away the bottom layer means a
qualitative change in the top layer, rather than moving those with low status to the
rank of high status, or simply improving their level of welfare in ways which leave
the hierarchy intact.
Highlighting the harms of superior treatment, as discussed in the previous section
also helps us to keep in mind that it is the hierarchy itself that is the problem as it
traps both those of higher and lower status in a dependent relationship. This implies
that we cannot view those at the top of a hierarchy simplistically, merely as
orchestrators of the inequalities who somehow benefit from the hierarchy without
also being under its influence. Hierarchies of social value, besides the harms
discussed, also restrict those of higher status. Indeed, those at the top of the
hierarchy, who enjoy its privileges, could even be very much against it. I am not
saying that those at the top bear no responsibility or have no power—they do—but I
think it is important not to view them as somehow apart from the hierarchy that
privileges them. They are themselves constrained by its rules and norms—usually
constraints that help to keep the hierarchy intact. For example, contrary to the notion
that the power of slave-owners was limitless, John Arthur points to restrictions
placed on slave-owners, such as that they were forbidden to teach their slaves to
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read or write (Arthur 2007, pp. 93–94). A hierarchy does not imply that those at the
top can do whatever they like, and where their privileges are likely to be constrained
is particularly in their ability to subvert the hierarchy.
Furthermore, although social equality could have implications for resources or
welfare, it is not primarily concerned with the actual levels of goods or well-being
that those at the top or bottom of the hierarchy have, but rather with the relationship
they have with each other. Ultimately, social equality is likely to lead to higher
levels of overall welfare or improved welfare for the worst off (this is indicated by
the extent of the harmful effects that result from social equality). However, these
improvements in welfare would be viewed as a welcome consequence of equal
social relations—we cannot simply say that social equality can be reduced to
improving welfare. Considering the harmful effects of status hierarchies, it is likely
that destroying a social hierarchy will always lead to improvements in the welfare of
the worst off. If, however, social equality can be shown to be intrinsically valuable
then there could, at least hypothetically, be cases where eliminating a status
hierarchy would be valuable even if no-one’s welfare was improved or even if the
welfare of the worst off was decreased. This would then seem to evoke the
Levelling Down Objection (LDO) against social equality. The LDO states that
egalitarianism is problematic as it would value bringing about an overall decrease in
welfare to the better off without increasing the overall welfare of anyone who is
among the worst off (Parfit 1997).
There are two possible responses in terms of the LDO’s applicability to social
equality:
1. In the form presented by Parfit, the LDO would not apply to social equality as it
is only intended to apply to telic forms of egalitarianism which value equality of
welfare per se (Parfit 1997, pp. 204, 210–212). Social equality thus avoids the
LDO as it indicates that levelling down is indeed valuable but not because
equality of welfare is valuable per se, but in order to reduce or eliminate
hierarchical relationships.
2. Martin O’Neill has argued, however, that the LDO can indeed be applied to
other forms of egalitarianism (O’Neill 2008, pp. 140–152). However, he claims
that pluralism provides a ‘knockdown response’ (O’Neill 2008, p. 143) to the
LDO as ‘unless we hold an implausible one-eyed egalitarianism that claims that
egalitarian reasons should always trump all other reasons, and hence that we
should always level down, the Levelling Down Objection is unproblematic’
(O’Neill 2008, p. 144). Thus we can say that social equality would only be
problematic if it had absolute priority over all other values, and thus, if this
were the case, it would consistently advocate social equality over improving
welfare. However, as long as we view social equality as one of a number of
values, such as welfare, we will not necessarily advocate social equality when
this does not improve welfare.
O’Neill goes on to explain that the pluralist response is definitive against the
LDO in all but the starkest of cases, where levelling down would not lead to
improvements in welfare for anyone and it would also not lead to a ‘better state of
affairs’ for egalitarian reasons, such as an improvement in status equality (O’Neill
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2008, p. 150). A theory of social equality, however, would not advocate levelling
down except in cases where status equality would be improved, and thus the starkest
of cases should not follow from a commitment to social equality.
Conclusion
To summarise: Social equality is an opposition to hierarchies of social status which
treat individuals as inferior or superior. Social inequalities are harmful, potentially
intrinsically so, however they are more clearly harmful because they lead to a range
of ill effects including to those of higher status.
My description of social equality is preliminary—necessarily so as it has been
neglected as a topic and requires in-depth analysis from the ground up. We can use
this preliminary, clarifying description to initiate a debate that could help in the
development of a robust, comprehensive theory of social equality.
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